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The *-calculus with multiplicities is a refinement of the lazy
*-calculus where the argument in an application comes with a multi-
plicity, which is an upper bound to the number of its uses. This intro-
duces potential deadlocks in the evaluation. We study the discriminat-
ing power of this calculus over the usual *-terms. We prove in particular
that the observational equivalence induced by contexts with multi-
plicities coincides with the equality of Le vyLongo trees associated
with *-terms. This is a consequence of the characterization we give of
the corresponding observational precongruence, as an intensional
preorder involving ’-expansion, namely, Ong’s lazy PlotkinScott
Engeler preorder. ] 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
1. INTRODUCTION
The *-calculus with multiplicities was introduced in [5]
for the purpose of studying the relationship between the
*-calculus and Milner’s ?-calculus [13]. It is a ‘‘resource
conscious’’ refinement of the *-calculus, based on the
following observation: in an application MN the argument
N is infinitely available for the function M. This appears
clearly in the process of ;-reduction: when M is an abstrac-
tion *xR, the application MN reduces to R[Nx] where the
argument is copied within R as many times as there are free
occurrences of x. One cannot predict the ‘‘multiplicity’’ of x
in R, because R could be reduced to another term where this
variable is duplicated. For instance if R=(2x) where
2=*fy . f ( fy), then the variable x occurs just once in R, but
R reduces to a term where x appears twice.
In our refinement of the *-calculus, any argument comes
with an explicit, finite or infinite multiplicity. Namely, we
write MN m where m # N _ [], meaning that N is
available at most m times for the function M. As a particular
case, we get the usual *-terms, where all the multiplicities
are infinitein which case we may omit them, to keep
the standard notation. For example, in (*x(2x)) I1, the
argument I=*zz (the identity) is available only once. We
have to be careful in defining the reduction process, since
reducing this term to 2I would mean to transform a limited
resource into an infinite one, for 2x really stands for 2x.
Obviously this is not what we want. Then we have to delay
in some sense the use of the resource, until something is
really needed for the variable it is bound to.
To this end, it is convenient to use something similar to
the explicit substitutions of Curien and co-workers [1].
That is, we extend the syntax with the construct M(Nmx)
meaning that N may be used as a value for x in M at most
m times, and we modify the ;-reduction rule in the obvious
way:
(*xM) Nm  M(N mx).
We will call (Nmx) a declaration, since M(Nmx) is
similar to (M where x=Nm), and behaves quite differently
from the (meta-)operation of substitution.
In this paper we adopt the ‘‘lazy’’ regime of reduction of
Abramsky and Ong [2], where, in order to compute MNm,
one has first to evaluate M, hopefully to an abstraction.
Similarly, to compute a term M(Nmx) one first computes
M. Then one fetches a sample N of the resource (if any, that
is if m>0), leaving the rest for future use, whenever the
computation cannot proceed without a value for x, that is
whenever x occurs in the head position in M. In this case
M=xQ1 } } } Qk , where the Qi ’s are either arguments with
multiplicity Rm or declarations (Rmyi) (with yi {x), and
the following reduction takes place:
xQ1 } } } Qk(Nm+1x)  NQ1 } } } Qk(Nmx).
Defined in this way, the reduction process is entirely deter-
ministic: for any term there is at most one reduction that can
be performed from it in one step.
Clearly what is new, with respect to the usual *-calculus,
is the possibility of deadlock: if something is needed for x,
but there is no resource available for x, then no reduction is
possible. For instance, we have
(*x .xx) I1  (xx)(I1x)
 (Ix)(I0x)
 z(xz)(I0x)
 x(xz)(I0x).
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However, we do not wish to regard a normal form such as
x(xz)(I0x) as a meaningful value. Here, as in the lazy
*-calculus, a value is a normal form that waits for an input.
In other words, a value is an abstraction, up to the iden-
tification of (*xM)(Nmy) with *x(M(N my) ). This
allows us to define the observational semantics of the
calculus, namely the preorder MPm N, as follows:
MPm N if and only if for any context (with multi-
plicities) C, if C[M] reduces to a value, then C[N]
reduces to a value, too.
Using Albert Meyer’s terminology, one can read ‘‘C[M]
reduces to a value’’ as ‘‘C[M] gives back the prompt.’’ Then
there are two ways for a term of not ‘‘giving back the
prompt’’: either it diverges, having an infinite computation,
or its evaluation ends up with a deadlock, that is a normal
form which is not observable. In our observational seman-
tics, we do not distinguish deadlock from divergence.
Our purpose in this paper is to determine precisely to
which extent the *-calculus with multiplicities is a refine-
ment of the usual *-calculus. That is, we shall study and
characterize the discriminating power of contexts with mul-
tiplicities over the *-terms. In more technical terms, we will
study the restriction to *-terms of the preorder Pm .
Our results are as follows: foremost, it is immediate
that Pm is strictly finer than the observational preorder,
denoted Pl , that we get by restricting the contexts to be
*-calculus contexts, with infinite multiplicities (this is the
preorder defined by Abramsky and Ong [2]). For
instance, x(*y .xy)Pl xx, while x(*y .xy)P m xx since
(x(*y .xy))(I1x) reduces to the value *y((xy)(*y .xyz)
(I0x) ), whereas this is not the case for xx(I1x) , as
we have seen above. In other words, the lazy *-calculus is
sensitive to the lack of resources. This is not very surprising.
As we will see, the extra discriminating power of finite multi-
plicities only shows up when applied to *-terms exhibiting
themselves some multiplicity: if M and N are two affine
*-terms, which use resources at most once, that is terms
where any variable (free or bound) has at most one
occurrence, then
MPm N  MPl N.
We also examine the possible weakenings of the theory Pm,
by adding new axioms. We show that no such weakening
can be as weak as Pl .
Our main result is the characterization of the preorder
Pm over *-terms. We show that it coincides with the lazy
PlotkinScottEngeler preorder introduced by Ong in [15].
This is an ordering on an intensional representation of
*-terms, the so-called Le vyLongo trees. These are like
Bo hm trees, but adjusted to suit the lazy regime where any
divergent term as 0=(*xxx)(*xxx) is different from *x0.
The lazy PSE ordering on these trees is basically the prefix
ordering, for which 0 is less than everything, together with
the facts that ’-expansion is increasing, that is
MPm *x .Mx (x is not free in M ), and that anything is less
than a term of infinite ordertypically, 5 such that
5=; *x5, for instance 5=(*fx . ff )(*fx . ff ).
The lazy PSE ordering was introduced by Ong to charac-
terize the ‘‘local structure’’ (following Barendregt’s
terminology) of some models of the lazy *-calculus. An
immediate consequence of our main result and of results by
Ong and Abramsky (namely, Theorem 3.3 of [15] and
Proposition 7.2.10 of [2]) is that finite multiplicities
provide us with strictly more discriminating power than the
convergence testing combinators, introduced by Abramsky
and Ong [2] to make the lazy *-calculus ‘‘complete’’ in
some sense. Regarding the parallel convergence testing com-
binator, this may be surprising because there is no parallel
feature in our *-calculus with multiplicities. The same
remark holds as well if, instead of using this combinator,
we use a non-deterministic choice, as in [4], or a parallel
composition of functions, as in [6]. Therefore the sensitivity
of the *-calculus to the lack of resources is much greater
than one could think.
Another consequence of our characterization result is
that the observational equivalence M&m N over *-terms,
meaning that for any context C with multiplicities, C[M]
has a value if and only if C[N] has a value, coincides with
the equality of the associated Le vyLongo trees. From this
and previous results of Sangiorgi [16], we can draw some
conclusions. Sangiorgi studied the equivalence M&? N
induced by Milner’s encoding of the *-calculus into the
?-calculus [13], and he showed in particular that this
coincides with the equality of the associated Le vyLongo
trees. We can then conclude that, as far as the *-calculus
is concerned, the ?-calculus and the *-calculus with
multiplicities have the same discriminating power:
M&? N  M&m N.
Again, this may be surprising because the latter is a deter-
ministic calculus, with no parallel facility. We must also
point out that Sangiorgi used a kind of bisimulation as the
semantic equivalence, while we use the much weaker notion
of observational equivalence. Nevertheless, our results show
that even if we use an observational equivalence for the
?-calculus, we still keep the same induced semantics on
*-terms, namely the equality of Le vyLongo trees.
Sangiorgi also showed that one cannot go beyond &? by
extending the contexts using ‘‘well-formed operators,’’ while
adding a unary non-deterministic operator +M with
evaluation rules
+ M  M and +  0
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is enough to get the full discriminating power of the
?-calculus. Note that this operator has some flavour of
introducing potential deadlocks, since +M  0 means that
M, regarded as a resource, may vanish. However, this is
only true if we defer a part of the discriminating power to
the semantic equivalence itself, using the bisimulation for
instance. Sangiorgi then concluded that ‘‘non-determinism is
exactly what is necessary to add to the *-calculus to make it
as discriminating as the ?-calculus.’’ As far as one is commit-
ted to use ‘‘well-formed operators,’’ while being allowed
to use a bisimulation semantics, this is true. However,
using explicit declarations, which provide us with a
computationally meaningful construct, and still using an
observational semantics, which in non-deterministic calculi
is usually far less discriminating than bisimulation, we may
have a different conclusion: the possibility of deadlocks is
essentially what the ?-calculus adds to the lazy *-calculus.
2. THE *-CALCULUS WITH MULTIPLICITIES
2.1. Syntax
As usual, we assume given a countable set Var of
variables, ranged over by x, y, z, ... . The set 4m of terms of
the *-calculus with multiplicities, or *m -terms, is generated
by the following grammar:
E ::=x |*xE | (EE m) | (E(E mx) ).
Here m is positive integer, or the infinite multiplicity, that is
m # N _ []. To avoid any confusion with usual *-terms,
denoted by M, N, ..., we use E, F, ... to range over *m -terms
(here ‘‘m’’ stands for ‘‘multiplicities’’. In [5], we also intro-
duced a * r-calculus, i.e., a *-calculus with resources).
However, we shall most often omit the infinite multiplicity,
writing EF and E(Fx) for EF  and E(F x) respec-
tively. That is, we regard ordinary *-terms as particular
cases of terms with multiplicities. We call E m a bag, made of
m copies of the term E. The set of bags is denoted by 6. We
use P, Q, R, ... to range over bags, or declarations (E mx).
As it is standard, we abbreviate *x1 } } } *xn E into
*x1 } } } xn .E and use EP1 } } } Pk to denote ( } } } (EP1) } } } Pk),
where the Pi ’s are bags or declarations.
The notions of free and bound variables are the standard
ones (see [3]), augmented by the following items:
v the free variables of a bag E m or a declaration (E mx)
are the free variables of E;
v in E(Px) every free occurrence of x in E is bound by
the declaration (Px) .
We denote by fv(E ) (resp. bv(E )) the set of free (resp.
bound) variables of a term E, and by 40m the set of closed
terms. The set of closed bags is denoted 60.
As usual, a (*m&)context is any term built using the syn-
tax of *m-terms, plus an additional constant [], the hole.
Filling the hole with a term E in a context C results in a term
denoted C[E]. Note that free variables of E may be bound
by the context in C[E]. We denote the set of contexts by
4m[], and use C, D, . . . to range over *m-contexts.
2.2. Syntactic Equality
We shall consider *m -terms up to :-conversion. To define
the syntactic equality of terms, we use the (partial) opera-
tion of renaming E[ yx] where y is neither free nor bound
in E. This is defined as follows:
z[ yx]={yz
if z=x
otherwise
(*zE )[ yx]={*zE*z(E[ yx])
if z=x
otherwise
(EF m)[ yx]=(E[ yx])(F[ yx])m
(E(F mz) )[ yx]={
E( (F[ yx])mz)
if z=x
(E[ yx])( (F[ yx])mz)
otherwise
.
Now the syntactic equality of *m-terms is the congruence #
generated by the following axioms:
*xE=*y(E[ yx]) y  fv(E ) _ bv(E )
E(Px)=(E[ yx])(Py) y  fv(E ) _ bv(E )
(*xE )(Py)=*x(E(Py) ) x  fv(P) _ [ y].
The third axiom has been added because it is more
convenient to deal with normal forms which are simply
abstractions, rather than ‘‘closures’’ (*xE )(P1 x1) } } }
(Pk xk). One could have considered other cases for syntac-
tic equality, like E(Px)=E when x  fv(E ) for instance.
However, we will regard this as a semantic equality. It is
immediate, by induction on the definition of E#F (includ-
ing the implicit axioms of reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity,
and congruence), that E#F O fv(E )=fv(F ).
Proposition 2.1.
1. *xE#(*yF )(Pz) implies E=E $ (Qz$) and E $
[wx](Qz$) #F[wy](Pz);
2. *xE#*yF implies E[zx]#F[zy];
3. E(Px)#F(Qy) implies P#Q and E[zx]#
F[zy];
4. EP#F implies F=F $Q and E#F $ and P#Q; if
E#F and E=*xE $ or E=E $ (Px) then F=*yF $ or
F=F $(Qy) .
Proof. By induction on the inference of the syntactic
equivalence, straightforward. K
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2.3. The Reduction Relation
Evaluation in the *-calculus with multiplicities follows
the lazy strategy of Abramsky and Ong [2], where one does
not evaluate the body M of an abstraction *xM, nor the
argument N in application MN. However, there are some
differences, mainly because we perform the substitutions
explicitly, and in a delayed manner. As we said in the Intro-
duction, the substitution is performed in the manner
xQ1 } } } Qk(Nm+1x)  NQ1 } } } Qk(Nmx) ,
provided that no Qi is a declaration for x, and x is not free
in N. To formalize this reduction by means of rules, we
introduce an auxiliary evaluation relation ^, which is only
defined for terms of the form E(Fx) where x occurs in the
head position in E. Then E(Fx) ^ E $ means that E $ is E
where F is placed in the head position (provided that no free
variable is captured).
Definition 2.2. The reduction relation m on 4m is
the least one satisfying the following rules, where P is a bag:
(*xE ) P  E(Px)
E  E $
EP  E $P
E  E $
E(Px)  E $(Px)
E(Fx) ^ E $
E(F m+1x)  E $(F mx)
x  fv(F )
F#E E  E $
F  E $
Here the fetch relation ^ is defined by
x(Ex) ^ E
E(Fx) ^ E $
(EP)(Fx) ^ E $P
E(Fx) ^ E $
(E(Pz) )(Fx) ^ E $(Pz)
z{x and z  fv(F ).
One should note that, to infer E m E $, one often has to
rename bound variables in E to fulfil the requirements
about bound variables in the rules. For instance, we have
(x(xy))(xy)( (xy)2x) #(z(zu))(zu)( (xy)2z)
m ((xy)(zu))(zu)( (xy)
1z).
The following proposition guarantees that m is deter-
ministic, up to #. That is, if E reduces into F and G then
F#G.
Proposition 2.3. The relation # is consistent w.r.t. m.
Namely,
E#F 6 E m E $ 6 F m F $ O E $#F $.
In particular, if E m E $ and E m F $ then E $#F $.
Proof. The interesting case is when F m F $ is not due
to the last rule of Definition 2.2. Under this assumption and
by Proposition 2.1, both E and F must have an abstraction
or a variable in the head position. We check the deter-
minacy for these two cases, focusing on the cases where
E and F are redexes, since the general case follows by
congruence.
1. (*xE ) P#(*yF ) Q O E(Px)#F(Qy). By Prop-
osition 2.1(4), (*xE ) P#(*yF ) Q implies *xE#*yF 6
P#Q. Now let z  fv(E ) _ bv(E ) _ fv(F ) _ bv(F ). Then
*zE[zx]#*xE#*yF#*zF[zy]. Moreover, by Proposi-
tion 2.1(2), E[zx]#F[zy]. Hence, by congruence,
E[zx](Pz)#F[zy](Qz). The result is obtained by
noticing that E(Px) #E[zx](Pz) and F(Qy)#
F[zy](Qz).
2. E(Fx) ^ E $ 6 G(Hx) ^ G$ 6 E#G 6 F#H O
E $#G$. Actually, besides this statement, we shall also prove
that
E(Fx) ^ E $ O E[wz](Fx) ^ E $[wz],
(V)
w  fv(E ) _ bv(E ) _ fv(F ) _ [x].
We proceed by induction on the proof of E(Fx) ^ E $.
(a) The basic case is E=x and E $=F. Then G=x is
an immediate consequence of E#G. Hence E $#G$ follows
from F#H. Also (V) is straightforward since z  fv(F )
(hence z  fv(H) because F#H ).
(b) If E(Fx) ^ E $ is proved using the second rule of
the fetch relation, then E $#G$ follows from to Proposi-
tion 2.1(4) and the inductive hypothesis.
(c) Otherwise E=E"(Pz) , and G=G"(P$z$) , by
Proposition 2.1(4) and the fact that the fetch relation is not
defined on abstractions. Let w  fv(F ) _ [x] _ fv(E ) _
bv(E ) _ fv(G) _ bv(G). By Proposition 2.1(3) E"[wz]#
G"[wz$]; hence, since by hypothesis E"(Fx) ^ E + and
G"(Hx) ^ G+, we have by ( V ), E"[wz](Fx) ^
E +[wz] and G"[wz$](Hx) ^ G+[wz]. Again, by
inductive hypothesis, E +[wz]#G+[wz]. The equiv-
alence E $#G$ follows easily by congruence.
We let the reader check that (V) holds. K
3. THE OBSERVATIONAL SEMANTICS
3.1. Observational Preorder and the Context Lemma
In this section, we introduce the observational semantics
of our *-calculus with multiplicities. It is an instance of the
standard Morris’ ‘‘extensional operational semantics’’ (see
[3, Exercise 16.5.5; 10, Chap. IV]). The idea is to use the
syntactic machinery to ‘‘test’’ the expressions by plugging
them into contexts, and looking for an observable result,
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that is, a value. Then an expression is better than another
one if it passes successfully more tests.
A term E is a value if there exist x and F such that
E#*xF. Let *m be the reflexive and transitive closure of
m . Then the convergence and divergence predicates on
closed terms are defined, as usual, by
E -m  _E$ value .E *m E$ (‘‘E converges’’)
E m  c(E -m) (‘‘E diverges’’).
Notice that E m does not necessarily mean, as in the lazy
*-calculus, that the evaluation of E does not terminate.
Indeed, E ‘‘diverges’’ if its evaluation ends up with a
deadlock, typically a term of the form xQ1 } } } Qk(E0x)
R1 } } } Rn (where not Qi is a declaration for x). However, a
deadlock is regarded here as semantically the same as a
truly divergent term, such as 0=(*xxx)(*xxx). Some
other observation scenarios have been considered in [8]. It
should be obvious that
F#E O (E -m  F -m).
Definition 3.1. The observational preorder is the rela-
tion Pm on 4m defined as follows:
EPm F o=O
def
\C .C[E ],
C[F ] # 40m O (C[E ] -m O C[F ] -m).
Two terms E and F are observationally equivalent, in nota-
tion E&m F, whenever EPm F and FPm E.
Due to the universal quantification over contexts, the
definition of the observational preorder is not very
manageable: it is usually quite difficult to prove or disprove
an inequation EPm F. In [12], Milner stated and proved a
property called the context lemma, which was then
generalized to the *-calculus by Le vy [10], establishing
that, in order to ‘‘test’’ a (closed) *-term, it is enough to
apply it. We now show that this also holds in the *-calculus
with multiplicities (see also [5]). To this end, we first intro-
duce a restricted kind of contexts, the applicative contexts,
ranged over by K, L, ... . These are given by the grammar
K ::=[ ] | (KP) | K(Px),
where P is any bag. This allows us to define the applicative
testing preorder, which is the observational preorder restric-
ted to applicative contexts, that is,
EPAm F o=O
def
\K .K[E ],
K[F ] # 40m O (K[E ] -m O K[F ] -m).
Before proving the context lemma, establishing that the two
preorders Pm and P
A
m coincide, we need some auxiliary
results.
Lemma 3.2. Let K be an applicative context and x a
variable, not free in K. Then for any finite set U of variables
and any z  U _ [x], there exists an applicative K$ such that
fv(E) _ bv(E)U O K[E[zx]]#(K$[E ])[zx].
Proof. By induction on K. This is trivial for K=[ ]. If
K=(LP) then x is not free in L nor P, and K[E[zx]]=
(L[E[zx]]) P. By the induction hypothesis,
K[E[zx]]#(L$[E ])[zx] P
for some L$, therefore K[E[zx]]#((L$[E ]) P)[zx].
If K=L(Py) , there are two cases: if y=x, then we let
L$=L[vx] for some fresh v (in particular, v is not in
U _ [z]). We have K[E[zx]]#L$[E[zx]](Pv). By
the induction hypothesis, there exists L" such that
L$[E[zx]]#(L"[E ])[zx], therefore
K[E[zx]]#(L"[E ](Pv) )[zx].
Otherwise ( y{x), x cannot be free in L (nor in P). Then
by induction hypothesis there exists L$ such that
K[E[zx]]#(L$[E ][zx])(Py). Again, there are two
subcases: if y=z then K[E[zx]]#(L$[E ])(Px) , there-
fore K[E[zx]]#(L$[E ])(Px)[zx] since x is not free in
P. Otherwise ( y{z), we have K[E[zx]]#(L$[E ])(Py)
[zx]. K
An immediate consequence of this lemma is:
Corollary 3.3. If EPAm F and z{x is neither free nor
bound in E and F, then
E[zx]PAm F[zx].
Now we prove the context lemmathanks to the explicit
declarations, one may even prove it for arbitrary terms (that
is, not necessarily closed).
Lemma 3.4 (The Context Lemma). EPm F  EPAm F.
Proof. The direction ‘‘O’’ is obvious. To establish ‘‘o’’,
we use the notion of multiple context, that is the notion of a
context where there may be several kinds of holes, indexed
by positive integers, i.e., [ ] i . For any such context involv-
ing only holes whose indexes are less than k, we define
C[E1 , ..., Ek] in the obvious way, that is by filling the hole
[ ]i by the corresponding term Ei . We shall also use the
notation C[E ] for C[E1 , ..., Ek]. We show
E1PAm F1 6 } } } 6 EkPAm Fk
6 C[E1 , ..., Ek] -m O C[F1 , ..., Fk] -m ,
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where C[E ] and C[F ] are closed. Assuming that
C[E ] *m V for some value V, we show that C[F ] -m, by
induction on (l, h), w.r.t. the lexicographic ordering, where
l is the length of the evaluation sequence C[E ] *m V, and
h is the number of occurrences of holes in C. We may write
C=C0C1 } } } Cm where C0 is either a hole [ ]i , or a variable
x, or an abstraction context *xB, and the Cj ’s, for j>0, are
bags or declaration contexts. We examine the possible cases.
(This proof technique is directly adapted from Le vy’s [10],
with the notable difference that we are dealing with open
terms.)
C0=*xB. There are two sub-cases. If l=0 then
C[E ]=V is a value, therefore C1[E ], ..., Cm[E ] are decla-
rations, and C[F ] is a value, too.
Otherwise (l>0), there exists j (1 jm) such that
C1 , ..., Cj&1 are declarations, say (D1 x1) , ..., (Dj&1
xj&1), and Cj[E ] is a bag. Notice that
(*xB[E ])(D1[E ]x1) } } } (Dj&1[E ]xj&1)
#*z((B[E ])[zx](D1[E ]x1) } } } (Dj&1[E ]xj&1) )
for some fresh variable z. It should be clear that there exists
a context B$, obtained from B by renaming x by z, and by
replacing some of the holes [ ]i by [ ] i+k , such that
(B[E ])[zx]=B$[E , E $] where E$ i=Ei[zx]. By defini-
tion of the reduction relation, the term
G=(*z(B$[E , E $](D1[E ]x1) } } } (Dj&1[E ]xj&1) ))
_Cj[E ] } } } Cm[E ]
reduces to V by an evaluation sequence of length l. Let
C$=B$(D1 x1) } } } (Dj&1 xj&1)(Cj z) Cj+1 } } } Cm .
Then G m C$[E , E $] and C[F ] m C$[F , F $] where
F $i=Fi[zx], therefore we may apply the induction
hypothesis to conclude, since EiPAm Fi O Ei$P
A
m F i$ by
Corollary 3.3.
C0=x. In this case, l>0 since C[E ] is not a value.
Moreover, there exists j (1 jm) such that Cj=
(Dr+1x) and no C1[E ], ..., Cj&1[E ] is a declaration
for x. Without entering into the notational details, one can
see that
C[E ] m D[E ] Q1 } } } Qj&1(D[E ]
rz)
_Cj+1[E ] } } } Cm[E ],
where z is fresh, and Q1 , ..., Qj&1 are built from C1[E ], ...,
Cj&1[E ] by renaming x into z, and by renaming into fresh
variables that are bound by the Ci ’s (that is, more precisely,
the variables y # fv(D[E ]) such that, for some i<j, Ci is a
declaration for y). It should be clear that, as in the previous
case, we may find a context C$ and renamings E 1
t
, ..., Es
t
such
that
C$[E , E1
t
, ..., Es
t
]
=D[E ] Q1 } } } Qj&1(D[E ]rz) Cj+1[E ] } } } Cm[E ],
so that we also have
C[F ] m C$[F , F
1
t
, ..., F s
t
],
where the F i
t
’s are obtained from F by performing the same
renamings as in Ei
t
w.r.t. E . Therefore we can conclude using
the induction hypothesis and Corollary 3.3.
C0=[ ] i . Let C$ be the context EiC1 } } } Cm . It has
h&1 holes, and obviously C$[E ]=C[E ], therefore by
the induction hypothesis, C$[F ] -m. Since C$[F ]=
Ei C1[F ] } } } Cm[F ] and Ei PAm Fi , we conclude
Fi C1[F ] } } } Cm[F ] -m, that is C[F ] -m. K
The Context Lemma is important, for several reasons.
For instance, it shows that the *m-terms may be regarded as
functions, since their semantics is determined by applying
them to arguments (for a formalization of this point, see the
‘‘functionality theory’’ of [5]). Moreover, by restricting the
universal quantification over contexts, the context lemma
allows us to prove more easily some semantic relations. For
instance, one can use it to check the following:
Proposition 3.5. If E m F then E&m F. Moreover,
0Pm EPm 5 for any E.
We recall that 5=(*fx . ff )(*fx . ff ). This term is such
that K[5] -m for any applicative context K, while
K[0] m.
Using the Context Lemma, one can also prove that
’-expansion is increasing with respect to the observational
preorder, as we indicated in the introduction:
Lemma 3.6. x  fv(E) O EPm *x(Ex
).
The proof, which uses a result established in [5], is
deferred to Appendix A.
3.2. Encoding the Lazy *-Calculus
In this section we recall from [5] some facts concerning
the embedding of the (lazy) *-calculus of Abramsky and
Ong [2] into the *-calculus with multiplicities, and we
begin to study the semantics induced by the latter over
*-terms. It was shown in [5] that the contexts with
multiplicities are strictly more discriminating than ordinary
contexts (that is, with implicit infinite multiplicities). Here
we show that this happens in a way that cannot be repaired
88 BOUDOL AND LANEVE
File: 643J 255707 . By:CV . Date:04:06:96 . Time:16:17 LOP8M. V8.0. Page 01:01
Codes: 6153 Signs: 3887 . Length: 56 pic 0 pts, 236 mm
by adding further equations over 4m. The set 4 of *-terms
is given by the usual syntax:
M ::=x | *xM | (MM ).
As we said, to avoid any confusion with terms with multi-
plicities, we use the standard symbols, that is M, N. . . to
range over 4. The set of closed *-terms is 40. The lazy
evaluation M l N is defined by the following rules:
(*xM ) N  M[Nx]
M  M$
MN  M$N
.
We shall also write M ; N for the standard ;-reduction
(that is, M=C[(*xR) S] and N=C[R[Sx]] for some
*-context C with one hole), and M=; N for the ;-conver-
sion. We let Pl and &l be the observational preorder and
equivalence of the lazy *-calculus.
There is an obvious encoding of 4 into 4m , consisting in
imposing an explicit infinite multiplicity on the argument of
an application, that is:
x=x
*xM=*xM
MN=MN
In [5], it is proved that this encoding is correct, i.e.,
M Pm N O MPl N.
The converse implication holds if one restricts the observa-
tional preorder of *m to using only terms with infinite multi-
plicities. This means that we may regard the lazy *-calculus
as a subcalculus of the *m-calculus. For this reason infinite
multiplicities may be omitted, writing EF instead of EF .
Similarly, we also omit the explicit mention of the encoding,
writing M for M. We note also that the equivalence &m
on *-terms induced by the *-calculus with multiplicities con-
tains the standard ;-conversion (see [5] and Appendix A).
Proposition 3.7. M=; N O M&m N.
The encoding of the *-calculus into the *m-calculus is not
‘‘fully abstract.’’ In other words, the contexts with multi-
plicities provide us with more discriminating power. A typi-
cal example is this:
Example 3.8. The two *-terms 2=*xxx and 2$=
*xx(*yxy) are equated in the lazy *-calculus, that is
2&l 2$, but their encodings *xxx
 and *xx(*yxy) are
not *m-observationally equivalent, since (*xxx
) I1  while
(*xx(*yxy)) I1 -m , where I=*zz is the identity. (The
pair of terms 2, 2$ has been used by Le vy in [10,
Prop. 5.3.5] for a similar purpose.)
In other words, the preorder on *-terms induced by the
*-calculus with multiplicities, that is MPm N, or more
accurately M Pm N, is strictly finer than MPl N. We
shall see several other examples in the Section 6.
To conclude this section, we show that the *m-calculus
cannot be weakened by adding new inequations to coincide
with the lazy *-calculus (over 4). To this end, we adapt the
notion of functionality order of a term (see [11, 2]).
Roughly, the functionality order of E is the number of
nested abstraction E has or is convertible to.
Definition 3.9. The order of a *m-term is inductively
defined as follows:
(i) E has order 0, denoted E # Om0 , if c(_F .
E *m#*xF );
(ii) E has order n+1, denoted E # Omn+1 , if _F # O
m
n .
M *m#*xF;
(iii) E has order , denoted E # Om , if E  O
m
n , for any n.
The terms of proper n are defined as follows:
1. E has proper order 0, denoted E # POm0 , if E # O
m
0
and c(_P9 _x # fv(E) .E *m xP9 ). Every term in PO
m
0 is said
strongly unsolvable;
2. E has proper order n+1, denoted E # POmn+1, if
_F # POmn .E *m#*xF;
3. E has proper order , denoted E # POm , iff E # O
m
 .
For example *xx # Om1 but *xx  PO
m
1 , while *x0 # PO
m
1 .
Notice that x(F 0x) # POm0 because x does not occur free
in x(F 0x) . An example of term of infinite order is 5. It is
easy to see, using the Context Lemma, that the following
property holds:
Remark 3.10. If O # POm0 and T # PO
m
 then
OPm EPm T for any E.
To state our next results, it is convenient to use Baren-
dregt’s notations [3] regarding the inequational and equa-
tional theories, that is,
*lm |&E C= F o=O
def EPm F
*lm |&E=F o=O
def E&m F,
and similarly, for the lazy *-calculus, using *l in this case.
More generally, when we write T |&E C= F, we mean that
the pair (E, F ) is in the precongruence generated by the set
T of pairs of *m-terms. We now show that *lm is a (maxi-
mal) ‘‘fully lazy theory,’’ as is *l (see [2]).
Proposition 3.11. (i) *lm is a fully lazy theory, that is
for every m, n # N _ []:
\E # POmm \F # PO
m
n . (*lm |&E C= F  mn);
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(ii) *lm is a maximal fully lazy theory, i.e. for E, F # 4m
such that *lm |&% E C= F, then either *lm+E C= F is incon-
sistent or *lm+E C= F is not fully lazy.
Proof. (i) It is easy to check that if E # POmm and
F # POmn with mn then *lm |&E C= F. Now if E # PO
m
m
and F # POmn are such that *lm |&E C= F then mn,
because otherwise we would have
F I1 } } } I1
m&1 times
m while E I
1 } } } I1
m&1 times
-m.
(ii) If *lm |&% E C= F then there exists a context C such
that C[E ] -m and C[F ] m. That is C[F ] # PO
m
0 and
C[E ] # Omn , n{0. There are two cases:
1. C[E ] # POmn . Then the theory *lm+E C= F is not
fully lazy, since C[E ] C= C[F ] is a consequence of E C= F.
2. C[E ] # Omn "PO
m
n . Then C[E ]&m *x1 } } } xn .xi P9 .
Let k be the number of bags in the vector P9 . It is clear that
the context
C$=C I1 } } } I1
i&1 times
(*z1 } } } zk .I)1 I1 } } } I1
n&i times
is such that C$[E ]&m I and C$[F ]&m 0. So
*lm+E C= F |&I C= 0
hence
IX1 C= 0X
1
since C= is a precongruence, hence
X C= 0.
Since *lm |&0 C= X for any X, we have *lm+E C= F |&
X=0, therefore *lm+E C= F |&X=Y for any X and Y,
that is, the theory is inconsistent. K
An immediate consequence of this proposition is the
following:
Corollary 3.12. There exists no set T of pairs of
*m-terms such that, for every M, N # 4, *lm+T |&M C= N
if and only if *l |&M C= N.
Proof. Assume that there is such a T. Then *lm+T is
consistent, since I&3 l 0. On the other hand, *lm+T |&
*xxx=*xx*yxy (see Example 3.8), therefore *lm+T |&
(*xxx) I1=(*xx*yxy) I1. By Proposition 3.5, *lm+T |&
(*xxx) I1=x(I0x) and *lm+T |&(*xx*yxy) I
1=
*y(xy(I0x) ). By the previous proposition, *lm+
T |&x(I0x) =0 and *lm+T |&*y(xy(I
0x) )=*y0
therefore *lm+T is not fully lazy. But this contradicts a
result of Ong (see [2]) that *l is fully lazy. K
4. LAZY APPROXIMANTS AND LE VYLONGO TREES
In this section, we start relating the observational preor-
der Pm with an intensional representation
1 of *-terms due
to Le vy, and studied by Longo [11] and Ong [14]. In [9],
Le vy introduced a refinement of Wadsworth’s notion of
syntactic approximant [17], suited for the lazy *-calculus
where *x0 must be distinguished from 0. Then Le vy
defined an interpretation of the *-calculus, based on this
notion of ‘‘lazy approximant,’’ and he showed that the
induced preorder is a precongruence. Le vy’s interpretation
may be defined as follows:
Definition 4.1. The set N of (lazy) approximants,
ranged over by A, B, ..., is the least subset of 4 containing
*x1 } } } xn .0, and *x1 } } } xn .xA1 } } } Am whenever Ai # N.
For M # 4, the direct approximation of M is the term |(M )
of N inductively defined by:
|(*x . (*y .M ) NM1 } } } Mk)=*x .0
|(*x .yM1 } } } Mk)=*x .y|(M1) } } } |(Mk).
The interpretation of M # 4 is A(M )=[|(N) | M= ; N].
Le vy’s preorder on *-terms, denoted M C=L N, is the inclu-
sion of sets of approximants A(M )A(N ). The equality
M=L N is A(M )=A(N).
One may characterize Le vy’s preorder on approximants:
A C=L B if and only if A is a prefix of B, where the prefix
ordering is the precongruence  on approximants
generated by 0A. Using the Proposition 3.5, it is easy to
see that
AB O APm B.
It should be clear that ;-reduction increases the direct
approximation. Then the ChurchRosser property has the
following easy consequence (see [9]):
Lemma 4.2. For any M # 4, the set A(M ) is directed
with respect to the prefix preorder,
\A$, A" # A(M ) _A # A(M ) .A$A 6 A"A.
Moreover, it is easy to see that A(M) is in fact an
ideal, that is it is downward-closed with respect to the prefix
ordering:
A # A(M) 6 BA O B # A(M).
This is because any term M is ;-convertible to a redex,
namely (IM ), whose direct approximation is 0. In par-
ticular, we have 0 # A(M) for any M.
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In [11], Longo gave a suggestive presentation of Le vy’s
interpretation, by means of what is now called Le vyLongo
trees. These are refinements of the well-known Bo hm trees
(see [3]), that deal with the fact that, in the lazy *-calculus,
the unsolvable terms cannot be all identified to 0. The
Le vyLongo trees are possibly infinite, node-labelled
trees, where the labels are either (, representing terms of
infinite order as 5, or *x1 } } } xn .=, representing terms as
*x1 } } } xn .0, or *x1 } } } xn .x, representing the ‘‘head’’ of a
solvable term, as in Bo hm trees. To define these trees, let us
first recall the notion of a *-term of proper order n, with
n # N _ [] (see [2]).
1. M # PO0  \M$ .M *l M$ O _M" .M$ l M"
2. M # POn+1  _x_M$ # POn .M *l *xM$
3. M # PO  \n_x1 , ..., xn_M$ .M=; *x1 } } } xn .M$.
Definition 4.3. The Le vyLongo tree of a *-term M,
LT(M), is defined inductively as follows:
1. LT(M)=(, if M # PO ;
2. LT(M)=*x1 } } } xn .=, if M # POn with n # N;
3. LT(M)= *x1 } } } xn .x,
LT(M1) } } } LT(Mk)
if M=; *x1 } } } xn .xM1 } } } Mk.
To recover Le vy’s ordering M C=L N on the tree
representation, one defines an operation *xT on trees, con-
sisting in prefixing the label of the root of T by *x, with the
rule that *x(=(. Then a tree T is less than T $ whenever T $
is obtained from T by replacing some leaves labelled
*x1 } } } xn .= in T by trees *x1 } } } xn .T". Obviously,
M=L N means that M and N have the same Le vyLongo
tree, LT(M )=LT(N ).
One may observe that if a term M has a ;-normal form,
then LT(M ) is finite. On the other hand, an example of
infinite Le vyLongo tree is provided by Wadsworth’s com-
binator J, satisfying J=; *xy .x(Jy), which may be given by
J=(*f*xy .x( ffy))(*f*xy .x( ffy)). The tree for this term is
LT(J)=*xy0 .x
|
*y1 .y0
|
*y2 .y1
b
Regarding Le vy’s interpretation, a natural question is: is
there any observational semantics on *-terms that coincides
with C=L? As a matter of fact, neither Pl nor even Pm does
provide a right answer, for two reasons:
1. Le vy’s preorder does not deal with the fact that terms
of infinite order are greater than any other one
(Remark 3.10). For instance, I C=3 L 5 since A(I)=
[0, *x0, *xx] while A(5)=[0, *x10, ..., *x1 , ..., xn .0, ...].
2. Le vy’s preorder does not deal with the fact that
’-expansion is increasing (Lemma 3.6). Typically,
x C=3 L *y .xy since A(x)=[0, x] while A(*yxy)=
[0, *y0, *yx0, *yxy].
In other words, Le vy’s interpretation is not ‘‘fully abstract’’
with respect to Pm. However, we will see that it is adequate,
that is M C=L N O MPm N. Moreover, we will prove in the
next section that Le vy’s interpretation is equationally fully
abstract with respect to Pm, that is M=L N  M&m N.
As a first step towards these results, we establish a
property that we call the approximation lemma (cf. [10]). It
states that, in order for C[M] to converge (where M is a
*-term and C a *m-context), only a finite amount of
information about M is needed to know. Intuitively, this
should be clear, because M can only participate by a finite
number of reduction steps in the convergent computation of
C[M]. Moreover, it is only whenever M shows up in the
head position, as a function applied to a series of arguments,
that it has to exhibit some specific finite intensional content,
like beginning with a series of abstractions. Then any term
having at least the same intensional content is as good as M,
as far as the convergence within the context C is concerned.
The appropriate formalization of ‘‘finite intensional
content’’ is given by approximants.
Lemma 4.4 (The Approximation Lemma). For any
*m-context C and for every M # 4 with C[M] closed:
C[M] -m  _A .A # A(M ) 6 C[A] -m.
Proof. The implication ‘‘o’’ is easy, since M=; N
implies M&m N (Proposition 3.7), and |(N )Pm N since
Pm is a precongruence such that 0Pm X for any X.
To establish ‘‘O’’ we use multiple contexts, as in the con-
text lemma (again, the explicit declaration construct is very
convenient for this proof). We recall that C[M ] stands for
C[M1 , ..., Mp]. Let us denote by C[M ] - lm the fact that
C[M ] converges to an abstraction in l steps. Then we show
the following:
if C[M1 , ..., Pp] is closed and C[M1 , ..., Mp] - lm
then there exist A1 , ..., Ap such that Ai # A(Mi) and
C[A1 , ..., Ap] -m.
We proceed by induction on l, observing that the context C
may be written C0 C1 } } } Cn where C0 is either a hole [ ] i , or
a variable x, or an abstraction context *x D, and the Cj ’s for
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j>0, are either Dm or (Dmx) for some context D. We
examine the possible cases, the interesting one being
C0=[ ] i (case 2 below). We do not investigate the case
C0=x, since we may let C$=[ ]p+1 C1 } } } Cn , so that
C[E1 , ..., Ep]=C$[E1 , ..., ep , x] for any E1 , ..., Ep , and we
are in case 2 (or more precisely case 2b, where one can see
that the approximant taken for x in order for C$[E1 , ...,
Ep , x] to converge is x itself).
1. C0=*xD. There are two cases. If l=0 then C[M ]
is, possibly up to #, an abstraction and we can let Ai=0
for any i. Otherwise (l>0), there exists i such that Ci is a
bag D$m, and Cj are declarations for any j>i. Then we have
C[M ]# m D"[M , M $] C1[M ] } } } Ci&1[M ]
_(D$[M ]mz) Ci+1[M ] } } } Cn[M ] - l&1m ,
where z is fresh and D" is obtained from D by renaming
x by z, and by replacing some of the holes [ ] i by [ ]i+p , so
that (D[M ])[zx]=D"[M , M $] where Mi$=Mi [zx].
Then we let C$=D"C1 } } } Ci&1(D$mz) Ci+1 } } } Cn , so that
C[E ] m C$[E , E [zx]] for any E1 , ..., Ep such that C[E ]
is closed (note that the choice of z only depends on the
variables that are bound by C). By the induction hypothesis
there exist A$1 , ..., A$p and B1 , ..., Bp such that Ai # A(Mi)
and Bi # A(M$i), and C$[A$1 , ..., A$p , B1 , ..., Bp] -m. It is
easy to check that there exist A"1 , ..., A"p such that
A"i # A(Mi) and Bi=A"i [zx]. By Lemma 4.2, there exist
A1 , ..., Ap , respectively approximants of M1 , ..., Mp such
that A$iAi and A"iAi , therefore C[A ] -m since
C[A ] m C$[A , A [zx]], and BiAi [zx].
2. C0=[ ] i . Here C[M ]=MiC1[M ] } } } Cn[M ]. If
l=0 then Mi is an abstraction, and C1[M ], ..., Cn[M] are
substitution items. In this case we let Ai=|(Mi), and
Aj=0 for any j{i. Otherwise (l>0), there are three cases,
according as Mi is a normal form (with respect to l) or
not:
(a) Mi=*xM$. Let us assume, for simplicity, that C1
is an argument context Dm (otherwise we have to use # to
push the context C1 under the abstraction *x, as in the case
(1)). Then the normalizing derivation of C[M ] is of the
form
C[M ] m M$(D[M ]
mx) C2[M ] } } } Cn[M ] - l&1m .
We let C$=[ ]p+1 (Dmx) C2 } } } Cn , so that for any
E1 , ..., Ep where Ei=*xE such that C[E1 , ..., Ep] is closed,
we have C[E1 , ..., Ep] m C$[E1 , ..., Ep , E ]. By induction
hypothesis, there exist approximants A$1 , ..., A$p+1 of
M1 , ..., Mp , M$ such that C$[A $] -m. We let Aj=A$i for
j{i, and let Ai # A(Mi) be such that A$iAi and
*xAp+1Ai . Such an Ai exists by the Lemma 4.2, since
*xAp+1 # A(Mi), and we have Ai=*xB for some
BAp+1. Then C[A ] m B(D[A ]
mx) C2[A ] } } }
Cn[A ], therefore C[A ] -m.
(b) Mi=xL1 } } } Lq . In this case, there exists jn
such that Cj=(Dm+1x) . Without entering into the nota-
tional details, one can see that the normalizing derivation of
C[M ] is of the form
C[M ] m (D[M ] L1$
 } } } Lq$) Q1 } } } Qj&1
_(D[M ]mz) } } } Cn[M ] - l&1m ,
where z is fresh and L$1 , ..., L$q and Q1 , ..., Qj&1 are respec-
tively obtained from L1 , ..., Lq and C1[M ], ..., Cj&1[M ] by
renaming some variables (which are bound in C[M ]) with
fresh ones. It should be clear that we may find a context C$
and renamings M1
t
, ..., M s
t
such that
C$[M , L , M 1
t
, ..., Ms
t
]=(D[M ] L1$ } } } Lq$) Q1 } } } Qj&1
_(D[M ]mz) } } } Cn[M ].
By the induction hypothesis, there exist approximants
A$1 , ..., A$p , ..., Ah1 , ..., A
h
p , ..., B1 , ..., Bq
of M1 , ..., Mp , ..., M h1 , ..., M
h
p , ..., L$1 , ..., L$q , with 1h<s,
such that
C$[A $, B , A 1, ..., A s] a m.
Obviously, for some appropriate renamings B$1 , ..., B$q of
B1 , ..., Bq , the term xB1 } } } Bq is an approximant of Mi . We
use again the Lemma 4.2 to conclude.
(c) If Mi is not a lazy normal form, then the nor-
malizing derivation of C[M ] must start with a reduction of
Mi . We have shown in [5] that in this case there exists
M$ # 4 such that Mi l M$ and M$C1[M ] } } } Cn[M ] -
l $
m
with l $l&1. Then we let C$=[ ]p+1 C1 } } } Cn and we use
the induction hypothesis and Lemma 4.2. K
The Approximation Lemma holds in particular for any
*-context C (that is, more accurately, with infinite multi-
plicities) and in this case the lemma is a particular case of
Le vy’s Lemma 5.7 in [9] that this preordering C=L is a
precongruence, which he proved using the idea of Welch
that inside-out reductions are complete in some sense (see
[3]). However, the proof we give is, to our view, simpler.
One should remark that we make an essential use of the
construct of explicit declarations, in the cases (1) and (2.a).
As a corollary of the Approximation Lemma, we can now
prove the adequacy result mentioned above, relating Le vy’s
interpretation to the observational preorder:
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Theorem 4.5. For any *-terms M and N
M C=L N O MPm N.
Proof. Assume that M C=L N and C[M] -m, with both
C[M] and C[N] closed. Then, by the Approximation
Lemma, there exists A # A(M ) such that C[A] -m. By
definition of C=L , we also have A # A(N ), therefore
C[N] -m by the Approximation Lemma again. K
5. THE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE
DISCRIMINATING POWER OF MULTIPLICITIES
We have seen that Le vy’s preorder cannot coincide with
the restriction of Pm to *-terms. In this section, we aim at
characterizing this observational preorder as an ordering on
Le vyLongo trees, or more accurately as an intensional
ordering on *-terms. We already indicated that the reasons
for the above discrepancy are the absence of a top element
in C=L and that ’-expansion is not C=L-increasing. There-
fore it is necessary to weaken the intensional preorder C=L
into another one, taking into account these features. This
was done by Ong in [15], who called lazy Plotkin
ScottEngeler ordering the following preorder:
Definition 5.1. The preorder M C=
’
L N on *-terms is
given by
M C=
’
L N o=O
def
\k # N. M’k N,
where ’k is defined as follows:
1. M’0 N for any M and N;
2. M’k+1 N if and only if
(a) N # PO or
(b) M # POn and N=; *x1 } } } xm .N$ with mn, or
(c) M=; *x1 } } } xn .xM1 } } } Ms and N=; *x1 } } } xn
y1 } } } yt .xN1 } } } Ns Y1 } } } Yt for some N1 , ..., Ns and
Y1 , ..., Yt such that Mi’k Ni and yj
’
k Yj , with
yj  fv(xM1 } } } Ms).
In clause 2(c) of the definition, we implicitly assume that
the variables x1 , ..., xn , y1 , ..., yt are distinct. It is easy to
check that ’k and C=
’
L are indeed preorders. Moreover, it
should be clear that
M=L N  M C=
’
L N 6 N C=
’
L M,
since M C=L N O M
’
k N for any k. A remark on the nota-
tion: we should have used C=
’, 
L rather than C=
’
L (and
similarly for ’k) to indicate the two ingredients added to
Le vy’s preorder. We will content ourselves here using the
simpler C=
’
Las a matter of fact, the main difficulties come
from ’-expansion.
Example 5.2. Recall that Wadsworth’s combinator J
satisfies J=; *xy .x(Jy). It is equal to the identity in Scott’s
D model of the *-calculus. One can check that z’k (Jz)
for any k, therefore I C=
’
L J. On the other hand J C=3
’
L I, since
Jz ’1 z. Note that these two terms are distinguished in the
lazy *-calculus, since J0 -l while I0 l . We let the reader
check that 2$ C=3
’
L 2 (see Example 3.8), and that the least
index k such that 2$ ’k 2 is 2. This is the level at which their
Le vyLongo trees differ.
The following properties should be obvious:
Remark 5.3.
1. M’k+1 N O M
’
k N;
2. M$= ; M C=
’
L N=; N$ O M$ C=
’
L N$;
3. M’k N O *xM
’
k *xN.
We shall use the fact that the preorder C=
’
L is in some
sense a fixpoint. More precisely, we will use the following:
Proposition 5.4. If M C=
’
L N and M=; *z1 } } } zm .
xM1 } } } Ms then either N # PO or N=; *z1 } } } zmy1 } } } yt .
xN1 } } } NsY1 } } } Yt with yj  fv(xM1 } } } Ms)), Mi C=
’
L Ni
and yj C=
’
L Yj .
Proof. Assume that M C=
’
L N and M=; *z1 } } }
zm .xM1 } } } Ms and N  PO . Then for any k there exist
N k1 , ..., N
k
s , y1 , ..., ytk not in fv(xM1 } } } Ms) and Y
k
1 , ..., Y
k
tk
such that N= ; *z1 } } } zmy1 } } } ytk .xN
k
1 } } } Y
k
tk with
Mi’k N
k
i and yj
’
k Y
k
j . By the ChurchRosser property,
tk=th , N ki =; N
h
i and Y
k
j = ; Y
h
j for any k, h. Then by the
remark above, we may let Ni=N 0i and Yj=Y
0
j . K
Before proving our characterization result, establishing
that Pm and C=
’
L coincide over *-terms, let us first point out
a source of trouble. It is not very difficult to see that, if both
A and B are approximants, then A C=
’
L B if and only if there
exists an ’-expansion2 A$ of A such that A$B (the ‘‘only
if ’’ part may be proved by induction on B). However, it is
not true in general that if M C=
’
L N, then for any approxi-
mant A of M, there exists an ’-expansion of A which is an
approximant of N. For instance, we have A(x)=[0, x]
and
A(Jx)=[0, *y00, *y0 .x0, *y0 .x*y1 0,
*y0 .x*y1 .y00, . . .]
therefore, although x C=
’
L Jx, there is no A # A(Jx) such
that x C=
’
L A. The fact that we cannot express C=
’
L in terms
of approximants is one of the main difficulties in proving
our characterization theorem. There are two main points in
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the proof: the following key lemma, solving the aforemen-
tioned difficulty, and the separation lemma.
Lemma 5.5. x C=
’
L X O xPm X.
It is possible to give a direct proof of this lemma, showing
that C[X] -m if x C=
’
L X and C[x] -m, see [7]. However,
this proof is quite difficult and technical. In this paper, we
give an easy proof, using a result established in [5], namely,
that there is a functional interpretation of the *-calculus
with multiplicities which is adequate with respect to the
observational semantics. Since we do not deal with this
functional interpretation here, we defer the proof to the
Appendix A. We note an immediate consequence of this
lemma:
Corollary 5.6. For any A # N, A C=
’
L M O APm M.
Proof. By induction on A.
1. If A=*x1 } } } xn .0, that is A # POn , then M # Om for
some mn, and it is easy to see that APm M in this case,
since 0Pm X for any X (see Proposition 3.5).
2. If A=*x1 } } } xm .xA1 } } } As , then, by Proposition 5.4,
there are two cases: either M # PO , in which case
APm M is obvious (see the Remark 3.10), or M=;
*x1 } } } xm y1 } } } yt .xM1 } } } MsY1 } } } Yt with Ai C=
’
L Mi and
yj C=
’
L Yj . By induction hypothesis AiPm Mi . Moreover,
by Lemma 3.6 (’-expansion is increasing):
APm *x1 } } } xmy1 } } } yt .xA1 } } } Asy1 } } } yt .
Then we use the previous lemma, that is yi Pm Yi for
1it, and the fact that Pm is a precongruence to
conclude. K
The second key lemma, the Separation Lemma, states
that if M and N intensionally differ at some finite order, that
is M ’k N, then one can test the difference in the *m-
calculus. That is, there is a *m-context C separating these
two terms, in the sense that C[M] -m while C[N] m. The
proof, which is long and technical, uses a refinement of the
classical ‘‘Bo hm-out technique’’ (see [3]). As such, it uses
the tupling combinators
Pn=*x1 } } } xn+1.xn+1x1 } } } xn
and the associated projections
Uni =*x1 } } } xn .xi .
Then we show that if M ’k N then M and N may be
separated by means of a context of the form
[ ](Pm1q1 x1) } } } (P
mn
qn xn) P1 } } } Pr
where the bags Pj ’s are either Pmq , where m is finite, or
(Uni )
, or 0, and the mj ’s are finite. Let us call canonical
a context of this form.
Lemma 5.7 (The Separation Lemma). Let M, N # 4 be
such that M ’k N for some k. Then there exists a canonical
context C # 4m[] closing both M and N such that C[M] -m
and C[N] m.
The proof is given in the Appendix B. Let us just recall
here Bo hm’s extraction technique: assume for instance that
M= *x .x N= *x .x
N n N n
x Z x Z
N n N n
X X
where Y is not greater than V, for instance Y=0 while V is
a value (we assume that X, Y, Z and V are closed). Then one
would like to find a context C extracting the difference,
showing up Y from C[M], and V from C[N]. Since Y and
V are the second arguments of x in (xXY ) and (xXV ), one
should substitute U22 for the second occurrence of x in M
and N. However, we cannot simply use the context [ ]U22 ,
since x occurs in the head position in M and N. In this
position, the difference is in the first argument, so that we
should use here U21 for x. The solution is to first replace x by
a tupling combinator, namely P2 (because x is of arity 2 in
M and N), since then the abstraction on x will be replaced
by a series of new abstractions, one for each occurrence of
x, as it is clear from
MP2=; *z .z(*y .yXY ) Z
NP2=; *z .z(*y .yXV ) Z.
Now we can apply these terms to the sequence U21U
2
2 to
achieve the desired extraction. Note that a complication
arises whenever x also occurs free in the pair of subterms
that we want to extract, because this variable will be
replaced by a tupling combinator. For instance, as we will
see in the Proposition 6.1, using *-contexts cannot allow us
to separate the two terms G1=*x .x(x00)(x(x00) 0) and
G2=*x .x(x00)(x(*yx00y) 0)the reader is invited to
draw the trees: both G1 P2U
2
2 U
2
1 and G2P2 U
2
2U
2
1 converge,
respectively to (x00)[P2x]=; *z .z00 and (*y .x00y)
[P2 x]. A similar, simpler example is provided by the pair
2=*xxx and 2$=*xx(*yxy) of *-terms of Example 3.8.
This is where we use the multiplicities, basically by allowing
only a finite amount of tupling combinators.
We must point out that the Separation Lemma is the
only occasion where we really need the power of finite
multiplicities. In the basic case where M ’1 N, it turns out
that M and N are already separable in the lazy *-calculus.
However, it is important to be able to give in this case a
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resource of multiplicity 1 for the head variable (if any). Then
to prove by induction the separation property for
M ’k+1 N, we just increase the multiplicity of the resource
for the head variable by one. The discussion above should
also indicate that, as regards affine *-terms, the multi-
plicities are harmless: for such terms, any bag Em+1 is like
E since E will never be used more than once (E0 is always
like 0, since deadlock and divergence are identified). That
is, one may prove (see [7] and Appendix B):
Lemma 5.8 (The Separation Lemma, Affine Case). Let
M and N be affine *-terms such that M ’k N for some k.
Then there exists a *-context C closing both M and N such
that C[M] -m and C[N] m . That is, MPl N O M C=
’
L N
for M and N affine *-terms.
Now we can establish our main result:
Theorem 5.9. Let M and N be *-terms. Then M C=
’
L N
if and only if MPm N.
Proof. The implication ‘‘o’’ is the Separation Lemma.
For the converse, assume that M C=
’
L N and C[M] -m.
Then by the Approximation Lemma there exists A # A(M )
such that C[A] -m. Clearly A C=
’
L M, therefore A C=
’
L N,
hence C[N] -m by Corollary 5.6. K
An obvious corollary of this theorem is:
Corollary 5.10. M=L N  M&m N.
We mentioned in the introduction that Sangiorgi showed
in [16] that the equality of Le vyLongo trees =L also
coincides with the equality &? induced by the ?-calculus
over *-terms. We can then conclude that, as far as equality
of *-terms is concerned, the ?-calculus and the *m-calculus
have the same discriminating power,
M&? N  M&m N  M=L N, (V)
for M, N # 4. At first sight, this may be surprising, since the
latter is a deterministic calculus. Then one could interpret
this result as meaning that parallelism is of little use in
separating *-terms: what is important is to be able to
distinguish the successive appearances of a given variable in
the head position. As shown by Bo hm, the *-calculus
provides part of this ability. But it generally fails distin
guishing subterms like xM1 } } } Mk and *y .xM1 } } } Mky,
and this is where limited resources are useful.
Regarding the affine *-terms, it is easy to see that the
various preorders we considered (except Le vy’s) collapse
down to Pl . Obviously one has PmPl , therefore C=
’
L
Pl by the Theorem 5.9, while the other inclusion is the
Lemma 5.8. Therefore we have:
Theorem 5.11. Let M and N be affine *-terms. Then
M C=
’
L N  MPm N  MPl N.
In particular, for affine *-terms, the ?-calculus, as well as
the *m-calculus, is not more discriminating than the usual
lazy *-calculus, that is,
M&? N  M&l N, (VV)
for M and N affine. The results (V) and (VV) provide a
justification for our initial idea, which was to introduce mul-
tiplicities as a means to study the relationship between the
?-calculus and the *-calculus. Moreover, it looks somewhat
easier to use applicative *m-contexts to show the equality or
difference of *-terms, rather than ?-calculus contextsthis
is not quite fair, however: the simplest way is to draw
Le vyLongo trees!
6. CONVERGENCE TESTING AND
PARALLEL FEATURES
Our sentence that ‘‘parallelism is of little use in separating
*-term’’ seems to contradict the idea that, according to
Plotkin and Abramsky, some parallel features are missing
from the *-calculus. In this section we discuss this point.
In investigating the full abstraction problem for the lazy
*-calculus, Abramsky found out that this calculus is not
expressive enough. The problem is the following (see [2]):
there is a canonical denotational semantics, in a domain
satisfying D=(D  D)= , which is adequate for the lazy
*-calculus, but the semantic preorder it induces is strictly
finer than the observational preorder Pl . In other words,
lazy *-contexts are not powerful enough. Abramsky showed
that it is necessary to add some ‘‘convergence testing’’ and
parallel facilities to gain the same discriminating power as
the denotational semantics.
Let us recall some definitions and facts regarding the con-
vergence testing combinators. Abramsky and Ong estab-
lished the non-full-abstraction result by showing that the
two *-terms A1=*xx(x(*y0) 0)(*y0) and A2=*xx(*zx
(*y0) 0z)(*y0) are observationally indistinguishable,
whereas they are denotationally different. Their difference
shows off once one adds to the calculus a (sequential)
convergence testing combinator. That is, we enrich the
syntax of *-calculus with the following clause:
M ::= } } } | (cM ).
(This is not exactly the way taken in [2], where a constant
C is considered; this may be defined by C=*x(cx).) The
extended set of terms is 4c , and the reduction rules are
those of the lazy *-calculus plus the following ones:
c(*xM )  I
M  M$
cM  cM$
.
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In this calculus, a value is still any abstraction. Then we can
rephrase the notion of convergence, denoted -c , and those
of observational preorder and equivalence, denoted Pc and
&c, respectively. In this theory, the two terms A1 and A2
above are distinguished, since A1C c while A2C -c. These
two terms are also distinguished in the *-calculus with mul-
tiplicities, since A1(U21)
1  m while A2(U
2
1)
1 - m.
Extending the lazy *-calculus with a sequential con-
vergence testing is not enough, however. Abramsky showed
that one needs to add some parallel facility. That is, the syn-
tax of *-calculus is now enriched with the following clause:
M ::= } } } | (pMM ).
Again, Abramsky and Ong considered a combinator P,
which may be defined by P=*xy . (pxy). The reduction
rules are those of the lazy *-calculus plus the following ones:
p(*xM ) N  I pM(*xN)  I
M  M$, N  N$
pMN  pM$N$
.
The function p is parallel because it looks at its two
arguments simultaneouslyand the fastest to converge will
win the race. We denote by - p the convergence predicate in
the lazy *p -calculus, and by Pp and &p the corresponding
observational preorder and equivalence. Abramsky showed
(see [2, Prop. 7.2.10]) that Pp coincides with the semantical
preorder induced by the interpretation into the canonical
domain D=(D  D)= . In this interpretation, the two terms
2=*xxx and 2$=*xx(*yxy) of Example 3.8 are equal,
therefore 2&p 2$. Note that one may let (cM)=(pMM ),
so that *p is stronger than *c. Indeed, Abramsky and Ong
give a pair of denotationally distinct *c-terms (thus distinct
in *p ) that are not distinguished in the *c-calculus.
Since we are studying various preorders over pure
*-terms, one may wonder whether there exists a pair of
*-terms M and N satisfying the same property, that is
MPc N while MP p N. The answer is positive. That is, one
can show that the theory Pp , restricted to *-terms, is strictly
stronger than Pc.
Proposition 6.1. Let G1=*x .x(x00)(x(x00) 0) and
G2=*x .x(x00)(x(*yx00y) 0). Then G1 &c G2 , while
G1P  p and G2P - p .
Proof. Firstly it is easy to see that G1P p and G2P -p.
Now we show that G1 &c G2 . This requires extending the
notion of functionality order to the *c-calculus. In fact, one
just has to modify the definition of proper order 0, as
follows: M has proper order 0, denoted M # POc0 , iff
M # Oc0
and
c[_k _x ._N9 1 .M *c c( } } } c(xN9 1) N9 2 } } } ) N9 k].
Moreover, we use the property of *c that M -c O
M&c *xMx for any closed M. By this property, we just
have to prove that, whenever M00 c , the terms G1M and
G2M behave in the same way, as far as convergence is con-
cerned. The interesting cases are when M # Oci with i2.
(M # Oc0). Both G1M c and G2M c.
(M # Oc1). If M # PO
c
1 then it is immediate that G1 M c
and G2M c. Otherwise we have M&c *x(c( } } } c(xN9 1)
N9 2 } } } ) N9 k). Then observe that
G2M&c M(M00)(M(*y .M00y) 0)
&c (c( } } } c((M00) N9 1) N9 2 } } } ) N9 k)
(M(*yM00y) 0) c
and
G1M&c M(M00)(M(M00) 0)
&c (c( } } } c((M00) N9 1) N9 2 } } } ) N9 k)
_(M(M00) 0) c.
(M # Oc2). The case where M # PO
c
2 is again imme-
diate. Otherwise, if M # Oc2 "PO
c
2 then we have M&c
*x1x2 . (c( } } } c( yN9 1) N9 2 } } } ) N9 k). So we have two subcases,
according to y=x1 and y=x2 . We leave to the reader to
check that, in any case, G1M c and G2M c. K
The two *-terms G1 and G2 are also differentiated using
contexts with multiplicities. Indeed, it is easy to check that
G2 P22(U
2
2)
1 (U21)
1 -m while G1P
2
2(U
2
2)
1 (U21)
1 m.
This example shows that contexts with multiplicities may
simulate the use of parallel convergence testing. This is a
general fact, as we will see. This would be obvious if parallel
convergence testing were definable in the *-calculus with
multiplicities. However, this is not the case; in fact, sequen-
tial convergence testing is not even *m-definable, as we now
show.
Lemma 6.2. There is not closed *m-term T such that for
every E
TE1&m {I0
if E -m
otherwise
.
Proof. We proceed as Abramsky and Ong [2], showing
that for every E # 40m :
E&m I or [E0
1 -m  E(*y0)
1 -m].
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This is obvious if E # Omn with n{1, or E # PO
m
1 . Now
assume that E # Om1 "PO
m
1 . Then E *m#*xF with
F *m xQ1 } } } Qk , where no Qi is a declaration of the shape
(Px). If all the Qi ’s are declarations or k=0 then E&m I.
Otherwise, at least one Qi is not a declaration and
(*xF ) 01 m and (*xF )(*y0)
1 m. K
It is indeed possible to show that the preorder Pp , restric-
ted to *-terms, is weaker than Pm ; see [7]. However, this
turns out to be a consequence of our main result and of
some results by Ong. He introduced the lazy PSE-preorder
to characterize the local structure of some models of the lazy
*-calculus. In particular, he showed in [15] a soundness
result, and a consequence of this is that the lazy PSE-
preorder C=
’
L is adequate with respect to the denotational
semantics. In other words,
M C=
’
L N O MPp N.
Then an obvious corollary of this and our Characterization
Theorem 5.9 (together with previously mentioned facts) is:
Theorem 6.3. Let M and N be *-terms. Then
MPm N O MPp N O MPc N O MPl N.
Moreover, none of these implications can be reversed. The
counterexamples are
2$P m 2 while 2$&p 2,
where 2=*xxx and 2$=*xx(*yxy),
G2 P p G1 while G2 &c G1 ,
where G1=*x .x(x00)(x(x00) 0) and G2=*x .x(x00)
(x(*yx00y) 0),
A2P c A1 while A2 &l A1 ,
where A1=*xx(x(*y0) 0)(*y0) and A2=
*xx(*zx(*y0) 0z)(*y0). However, for M and N affine
*-terms, we have
MPm N  MPp N  MPc N  MPl N.
We may then conclude that parallelism is indeed useful in
separating *-term, as far as the purpose is to recover the
canonical denotational semantics. For this purpose, intro-
ducing finite multiplicities is not appropriate: they provide
a discriminating power which is far too strong.
We may also note another consequence of Theorem 6.3.
In [4], we showed that the semantical preorder, that is,
equivalently, the preorder Pp coincides with the observa-
tional preorder on the *-calculus extended with convergence
testing (cM ) and non-deterministic choice (MN ) (or
parallel composition (M&N ); see [6]). For instance, the
two terms G1 and G2 of Proposition 6.1 are distinguished
using non-deterministic choice: G2(U
2
1 U
2
2) has a value,
namely *y(U21U
2
2) 00y, while G1(U
2
1U
2
2) always
diverges (one does not really need the convergence testing
ability in this case, and this is not surprising since these two
terms are equated in *c). Then we may conclude that the
*-calculus with multiplicities is more discriminating over
*-terms than non-deterministic choice.
APPENDIX A: ’-EXPANSION AND LEMMA 5.5
In this appendix, we prove the ‘‘’-expansion lemma’’ 3.6
and Lemma 5.5. To this end we use a result established in
[5], showing the adequacy of a functionality theory with
respect to the observational semantics. The functionality
theory is an adaptation of the ‘‘intersection type discipline’’
of Coppo et al.. We refer the reader to [5] for the details,
and just recall here the necessary definitions and facts. There
are two kinds of functional characters, one for terms of the
calculus, and another for the bags. These are given by the
grammar
, ::=| | (?  ,)
? ::=, | (?_?).
The functionality theory is an inference system for proving
sequents of the form x1 : ?1 , ..., xk : ?k |&E : , and
x1 : ?1 , ..., xk : ?k |&P: ?. We use 1, 2, ... to denote the
assumptions, that is sequences x1 : ?1 , ..., xk : ?k . There is a
first group of rules, related to the constructions of the
calculus:
(var): x : , |&x : ,
(abs):
x : ?, 1 |&E : ,
1 |&*xE : ?  ,
(x not in 1)
(app):
1 |&E : ?  ,, 2 |&P : ?
1, 2 |& (EP) : ,
(subs):
x : ?, 1 |&E : ,, 2 |&P : ?
1, 2 |&E(Px) : ,
(x not in 1 )
(singl):
1 |&E : ,
1 |&E1 : ,
(bag):
1 |&Em : ?0 , 2 |&En : ?1
1, 2 |&Em+n : ?0_?1
.
Then there are rules independent from the structure of the
terms, which hold for both *-terms and bags. In particular,
there is a rule subsuming all the structural manipulations
one can make on an assumption. To state this rule, we write
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1r2 whenever 2 results from 1 by a sequence of structural
manipulations. That is, r is the least preorder on assump-
tions satisfying
1, x : ?, y : ?$, 2r1, y : ?$, x : ?, 2 (exchange)
1rx : ?, 1 (weakening)
x : ?0 , x : ?1 , 1rx : ?0_?1 , 1 (product).
Moreover, we use a congruence t over formulae, given as
the least one for which the product ?0_?1 is associative,
commutative and has | as a unit. Then, using T to denote
either a term or a bag, and {, _ to denote formulae of any
kind, our last rules are:
(triv): |&T : | (struc):
1 |&T : {
2 |&T : _
1r2 6 {t_.
We shall use 1 |& F T : { to mean that the sequent 1 |&T : {
is provable in the functionality system. For any term E, let
us denote by F (E ) the set of pairs (1, ,) such that
1 |& F E : ,. In [5] we proved the following Adequacy
Theorem:
F (E )F (F ) O EPm F.
In the proof, we established a property known as the ‘‘sub-
ject expansion’’ property. Regarding *-terms, one may show
a stronger property, namely that ;-conversion preserves the
functional characters:
Lemma A.1. M=; N O F(M )=F(N).
Proof Outline. The implication M ; N O F(N )
F(M ) is an immediate consequence of the subject expan-
sion property (Proposition 3.7 of [5]), and of the corre-
spondence between ;-reduction and *m-evaluation (see
the proof of Proposition 2.8 in [5]). The inclusion
F((*xM ) N)F(M[Nx]) is an easy consequence of
Lemma 3.4 of [5] (and, again, of the correspondence
between the notions of reduction). This implies the ‘‘subject
reduction’’ property M ; N  F(M )F(N) since the
relation F(E )F(F ) is a precongruence. The lemma
follows by the ChurchRosser property. K
Note that this lemma, combined with the Adequacy
Theorem, shows Proposition 3.7. We shall also use another
property proved in [5, Lemma 3.3].
Lemma A.2. 1 |&F E: , if and only if there exists an
assumption 2 on the free variables of E such that 2r1 and
2 |&F E: ,.
Before proving the ’-expansion lemma, we first observe
the following:
Remark A.3. x: ? |&F x: ? for any bag formula ?.
The proof, by induction on ?, consists in noting that, for
?=,, one uses (var), (singl), (triv), (bag), and (struc), as
follows:
x : , |&x : ,
x : , |&x1 : , |&x : |
x : , |&x : ,_|
x : , |&x : ,
while for ?=?0_?1 , we have, by induction on the for-
mulae, and using (bag) and (struc):
b
x : ?0 |&x : ?0
b
x : ?1 |&x : ?1
x : ?0 , x : ?1 |&x : ?
x : ? |&x : ?
.
Now Lemma 3.6 is established, thanks to de Adequacy
Theorem above, once we have shown:
Lemma A.4. 1 |&F E : , O 1 |&F *x(Ex) : , for any
,, provided x is not free in E.
Proof. By Lemma A.2, one may assume that x is not in
1. Then one proceeds by induction on ,. The statement is
trivial for ,=|, by (triv) and (struc). Otherwise, ,=?  ,
and, using Remark A.3 and the rules (app) and (abs), we
have
b
x : ? |&x : ?
b
1 |&E : ?  
x : ?, 1 |&Ex : 
1 |&*x(Ex) : ,
.
This completes the proof of EPm *x(Ex). K
Now from the Adequacy Theorem above, to prove our
Lemma 5.5, it is enough to show
x C=
’
L X 6 1 |&F x : , O 1 |&F X : ,.
As a matter of fact, one can note that 1 |&F x : , holds basi-
cally as an instance of (triv) or (var).
Lemma A.5. 1 |&F x : , if and only if either ,=| or
x : r1 for some  such that ,t.
Proof. The ‘‘o’’ direction is obvious, given the rules
(triv), (var), and (struc) of the functionality system. The
converse direction is easily established by induction on the
proof of 1 |&x: ,, which can only be inferred using (triv),
(var), or (struc). K
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Given this lemma, we may reduce our task to show:
Lemma A.6. x C=
’
L X O x : , |&F X : ,.
We proceed by induction on the size |,| of the formulae,
defined as follows:
|||=0
|?  ,|=1+|?|+|,|
|?0_?1 |=|?0 |+|?1 |.
First, we note the following:
Remark A.7. If the lemma is true up to size k, that is:
|,|<k 6 x C=
’
L X O x : , |&F X : , then
|?|<k 6 x C=
’
L X O x : ? |&F X
 : ?.
b
ym : ?m |&Y m : ?m
b
b
y1 : ?1 |&Y 1 : ?1 x : , |&x : ,
y2 : ?2 |&Y 2 : ?2 y1 : ?1 , x : , |&xY

1 : ?2  } } } ?n  |
b
ym : ?m , ..., y1 : ?1 , x : , |&xY 1 } } } Y

m : ?m+1  } } } ?n  |
b
x : , |&*y1 } } } ym .xY 1 } } } Y

m : ,
(b) mn. This case is trivial, since for any M and 1, we
have
mn O 1 |&F *y1 } } } ym .M : ?1  } } } ?n  |.
This is because
yn : ?n , ..., y1 : ?1 , 1 |&*yn+1 } } } ym .M : |
by (triv), and then one uses (abs) repetitively. K
APPENDIX B: THE SEPARATION LEMMA
In the proof of the lemma, we shall use 7, 5, ... to denote
sequences of declarations (P1 x1) } } } (Pnxn) . More
precisely, when we write E7 where 7=(P1 x1) } } }
(Pn xn) this must be read ( } } } (E(P1 x1) ) } } } (Pnxn) ).
We recall that Pn=
def *x1 } } } xn+1.xn+1 x1 } } } xn . In the
following Pmn stands for (Pn)
m.
Lemma 5.7 (The Separation Lemma). Let M, N # 4 and
fv(M ) _ fv(N)[x1 , ..., xn]. If M ’k N then there exists
p1 , ..., pn and m1 , ..., mn in N such that for any q1 , ..., qn with
The proof is essentially the same as that of Remark A.3,
replacing the use of (var) by a call to the hypothesis
x: , |&F X : ,.
The statement of the lemma is obvious for |,|=0, that is
,=|, by (triv) and (struc). Otherwise, we have ,=(?1 
( } } }  (?n  |) } } } )) and X=; *y1 } } } ym .xY1 } } } ym with
yi C=
’
L Yi , by Proposition 5.4. By Lemma A.1 (in fact, the
subject expansion property would suffice), it is enough to
show that
x : , |&F *y1 } } } ym .xY1 } } } ym : ,.
We distinguish two sub-cases:
(a) mn. Then, using the induction hypotheses, we
have yi : ?i |&F Y i : ?i for 1im, by Remark A.7. There-
fore, using the rules (app) m times and then (abs) m times:
qipi there exist closed bags P1 , ..., Pr with M(Pm1q1 x1) } } }
(Pmnqn xn) P1 } } } Pr -m and N(P
m1
q1 x1) } } } (P
mn
qn xn)
P1 } } } Pr m .
Proof. We proceed by induction on k, assuming that k
is the least integer such that M ’k N.
1. k=1. We systematically examine the possible cases,
according as M # POm for some m or not (i.e., M has a head
normal form), and similarly for N.
(a) If M # POm and N # Oh with h<m, we let mi=0 and
pi=0 for any i, r=h and Pj=0 (that is, more precisely,
Pj=0recall our convention that the omitted multi-
plicities are ) for any jr.
(b) If M=; *z1 } } } zm .xM1 } } } Ms and N # POh with
h<, there are two sub-cases. In any of these sub-cases, r
will not depend on q1 , ..., qn .
(i) If x=xi for some i<n (therefore x  [z1 , ..., zm]),
then we let mj=0 and pj=0 for j{i and mi=1, and
pi=s+(r&m) where r=max(m, h) and finally Pj=0 for
1 jr. Let 7=(P0q1 x1) } } } (P
0
qn xn) and 5=(P1 z1)
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} } } (Pmzm). We have, using the fact that
L(Kv) &m L[Kv], as shown in [5],
(M(Pm1q1 x1) } } } (P
mn
qn xn) ) 0 } } } 0
r
&m (*z1 } } } zm . (Pqi M1 } } } Ms) 7) 0 } } } 0
&m ((Pqi M1 } } } Ms) 75 ) 0 } } } 0
r&m
&m *ypi+1 } } } yqi+1
_(( yqi+1M1 } } } Ms 0 } } } 0ypi+1 } } } yqi) 75 ),
while
(N(Pm1q1 x1) } } } (P
mn
qn xn) ) 0 } } } 0
r
m
since N&m *v1 } } } vh .0 and rh.
(ii) If x=zi for some im we let mj=0 for any
j, r=max(m, h) and Pj=0 for j{i, and Pi=*y1 } } } yl .yl
where l=s+(r&m)+1. We have, if we let 7=(Pm1q1 x1)
} } } (Pmnqn xn) , and 5=(P1 z1) } } } (Pmzm) ,
(M(Pm1q1 x1) } } } (P
mn
qn xn) ) 0 } } } 0(*y1 } } } yl .yl) 0 } } } 0
r
&m (*z1 } } } zm . (zi M1 } } } Ms) 7)
_0 } } } 0(*y1 } } } yl .yl) 0 } } } 0
&m (((*y1 } } } yl .yl) M1 } } } Ms) 75 ) 0 } } } 0
r&m
&m I.
and (N(Pm1q1 x1) } } } (P
mn
qn xn) ) P1 } } } Pr m as in the pre-
vious case.
(c) If M= ; *z1 } } } zm .xM1 } } } Ms and N=; *z1 } } } zh .
zN1 } } } Nt , there are again several sub-cases.
(i) h<m. This case is similar to (1.a) above.
(ii) If hm, we distinguish again two sub-cases.
Notice that, by :-conversion, we may assume
zj  fv(xM1 } } } Ms) for m< jh.
(ii.1) If z{x, then either x is free in M, that is x=xi
for some i, or x=zi for some im. These cases are respec-
tively similar to (1.b.i) and (1.b.ii) above (note that if z is
free in N then z=xj with j{i, and mj=0).
(ii.2) If z=x then the only possibility is t{s+h&m,
and still we may have either x=xi with in or x=zi for
some im. Note that if x=xi we may assume, by :-conver-
sion, that x{zj for m< jh (otherwise we are back to the
previous case). Therefore there are four sub-cases:
(ii.2.1) If t<s+h&m and x=xi , we let mj=0 and
pj=0 for j{i and mi=1, pi=s+h&m. Now if q1 , ..., qn are
such that qjpj for any j, we let r=h+qi&t+1, Pj=0 for
j{h+qi&pi+1 (note that h+qi&pi+1<r since t<pi)
and Ph+qi&pi+1=*y1 } } } yl .yl where l=qi+pi&t+1. Let
7 and 5 be as in the case (1.b.i). We havein the under-
braced parts, we only count the number of arguments, not
of declarations
(M(Pm1q1 x1) } } } (P
mn
qn xn) ) P1 } } } Pr
&m (*z1 } } } zm . (Pqi M1 } } } Ms) 7) P1 } } } Pr
&m ((Pqi M1 } } } Ms) 75 ) Pm+1 } } }
pi
_Ph+1 } } } Ph+qi&pi+1
qi&pi+1
} } } Pr
pi&t
&m ((Ph+qi&pi+1 M1 } } } Ms 0 } } } 0) 75 ) 0 } } } 0
qi+pi&t
&m I,
while
(N(Pm1q1 x1) } } } (P
mn
qn xn) ) P1 } } } Pr
&m (*z1 } } } zh . (Pqi N1 } } } Nt) 7) P1 } } } Pr
&m ((Pqi N1 } } } Nt) 75$) Ph+1 } } } Ph+qi&pi+1
qi&pi+t+1
} } } Pr
pi&t
&m ((0N1 } } } Nt0 } } } 0) 75$)
_0 } } } Ph+qi&pi+1 } } } 0&m 0,
where 5$=(P1 z1) } } } (Phzh).
(ii.2.2) If t<s+h&m and x=zi , we let mj=0 for
any j, r=(l&t)+h+1 where l=h&m+s, Pj=0 for j{i
and j{h+1, Pi=*y1 } } } yl+1.yl+1 and Ph+1=
*v1 } } } vl&t+1.vl&t+1. We have
(M(Pm1q1 x1) } } } (P
mn
qn xn) ) P1 } } } Pr
&m (*z1 } } } zm . (zi M1 } } } Ms) 7) P1 } } } Pr
&m ((Pi M1 } } } Ms) 75 ) Pm+1 } } }
l
Ph+1 } } } Pr
l&t
&m Ph+1 } } } Pr &m I,
while
(N(Pm1q1 x1) } } } (P
mn
qn xn) ) P1 } } } Pr
&m (*z1 } } } zh . (ziN1 } } } Nt) 7) P1 } } } Pr
&m ((Pi N1 } } } Nt) 75$) Ph+1 } } } Pr
l&t+1
&m Pr=0.
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(ii.2.3) If t>s+h&m and x=xi , we let mj=0 and
pj=0 for j{i and mi=1, pi=t. Now if q1 , ..., qn are such
that qjpj for any j, we let r=qi&pi+h+1 and Pj=0 for
any jr. If we let l=r+s&m (note that l<qi+1), we
have
(M(Pm1q1 x1) } } } (P
mn
qn xn) ) P1 } } } Pr
&m (*z1 } } } zm . (Pqi M1 } } } Ms) 7) P1 } } } Pr
&m ((PqiM1 } } } Ms) 75 ) Pm+1 } } } Ph } } } Pr
qi&pi+1
&m *yl+1 } } } yqi+1. (( yqi+1M1 } } } Ms
_Pm+1 } } } Pr yl+1 } } } yqi+1) 75 ) - m ,
while
(N(Pm1q1 x1) } } } (P
mn
qn xn) ) P1 } } } Pr
&m (*z1 } } } zh . (Pqi N1 } } } Nt) 7) P1 } } } Pr
&m ((Pqi N1 } } } Nt) 75$) Ph+1 } } } Pr
qi&t+1
&m ((0N1 } } } Nt) 75$) Ph+1 } } } Pr+1 m .
(ii.2.4) If t>s+h&m and x=zi (im), we let
mj=0 and pj=0 for any j, and r=h+1, Pj=0 for j{i,
and Pi=*y1 } } } yt+1 . yt+1 . Let l=s+h&m. We have
(M(Pm1q1 x1) } } } (P
mn
qn xn) ) P1 } } } Pr
&m (*z1 } } } zm . (ziM1 } } } Ms) 7) P1 } } } Pr
&m ((PiM1 } } } Ms) 75) Pm+1 } } } Pr
h&m+1
&m *yl+2 } } } yt+1. yt+1 -m ,
while
(N(Pm1q1 x1) } } } (P
mn
qn xn) ) P1 } } } Pr
&m (*z1 } } } zh . (ziN1 } } } Nt) 7) P1 } } } Pr
&m ((Pi N1 } } } Nt) 75$) Ph+1&m Ph+1=0.
2. k>1. Since we assumed that M’k$ N for any k$<k,
the only possibility here is M=; *z1 } } } zm .xM1 } } } Ms
and N= ; *z1 } } } zm y1 } } } yt .xN1 } } } NsY1 } } } Yt , where yl 
fv(xM1 } } } Ms), with Ml ’k&1 Nl or yl
’
k&1 Yl for some l.
Then there are four sub-cases, according as x=xi or x=zi
for some i. We only examine two of them, the other ones
being similar.
(a) Ml  ’k&1 Nl and x=xi . We have
fv(Ml) _ fv(Nl)[x1 , ..., xn] _ [z1 , ..., zm] _ [ y1 , ..., yt],
and in fact fv(Ml)[x1 , ..., xn] _ [z1 , ..., zm]. By induction
hypothesis, there exist ?1 , ..., ?n , ?$1 , ..., ?$m , ?"1 , ..., ?"t , and
+1 , ..., +n , +$1 , ..., +$m , +"1 , ..., +"t such that for any }1 , ..., }n ,
}$1 , ..., }$m , }"1 , ..., }"t with }j?j , }$j?$j and }"j?"j there
exist Q1 , ..., Q\ such that, if we let 7=(P+1}1 x1) } } }
(P+n}n xn) , and 5=(P
+$1
}$1
z1) } } } (P
+$m
}$m
zm) and 1=
(P+"1}"1  y1) } } } (P
+"t
}"t
 yt)
Ml 751Q1 } } } Q\ -m ,
while
Nl 751Q1 } } } Q\ m .
Then the proof consists in finding a context C such that
C[M] is essentially Ml 751Q1 } } } Q\ , while C[N] gives
Nl751Q1 } } } Q\ .
We let mj=+j for j{i and mi=+i+1, pj=?j for j{i and
pi=max(?i , s+t). Given q1 , ..., qn such that qjpj for any
j, let Q1 , ..., Q\ be a sequence satisfying the property above
for }$j=?$j and }"j=?"j . We let r=\+h where
h=qi+1+m&s, and P1 , ..., Pr be the sequence defined as
follows:
P+$j?$j if 1 jm
P+"j&m?"j&m if m< jt
Pj={(*u1 } } } uqi .ul) if j=h.Qj&h if h< jr0 otherwise
This sequence is thus
P1 } } } Pr=P
+$1
?$1
} } } P+$m?$m P
+"1
?"1
} } } P+"t?"t 0 } } } 0
qi&(s+t)
PhQ1 } } } Q\ .
Therefore we have, if 7=(P+1q1 x1) } } } (P
+n
qn xn) , 5=
(P+$1?$1 z1) } } } (P
+$m
?$m
zm) and 1=(P
+"1
?"1
 y1) } } } (P
+"t
?"t
 yt) ,
and 1 $=(P+"1?"1vs+1) } } } (P
+"t
?"t
vs+t+1)
(M(Pm1q1 x1) } } } (P
mn
qn xn) ) P1 } } } Pr
&m (*z1 } } } zm . (Pqi M1 } } } Ms) 7) P1 } } } Pr
&m ((Pqi M1 } } } Ms) 75) Pm+1 } } } Pr
&m (*vs+t+1 } } } vqi+1((vqi+1M1 } } } Ms
_vs+1 } } } vqi) 751 $)) Pm+t+1 } } } Pr
&m ((Ph M1 } } } Msvs+1 } } } vqi&(s+t)0 } } } 0
qi
) 751 $)
_Q1 } } } Q\
&m (Ml751 $) Q1 } } } Q\ &m (Ml751 ) Q1 } } } Q\ -m ,
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while
(N(Pm1q1 x1) } } } (P
mn
qn xn) ) P1 } } } Pr
&m (*y1 } } } yt . (Pqi N1 } } } Ns Y1 } } } Yt) 75) Pm+1 } } } Pr
&m ((Pqi N1 } } } NsY1 } } } Yt) 751 ) Pm+t+1 } } } Pr
&m (*vs+t+1 } } } vqi+1((vqi+1N1 } } } Ns
_Y1 } } } Ytvs+t+1 } } } vqi) 751 )) Pm+t+1 } } } Pr
&m ((Ph N1 } } } NsY1 } } } Yt 0 } } } 0
qi
) 751) Q1 } } } Q\
&m (Nl751 ) Q1 } } } Q\  m .
(b) yl ’k&1 Yl and x=zi . We use the induction
hypothesis, as in the previous point, that is,
yl 751Q1 } } } Q\ &m P
+"l
}"l
Q1 } } } Q\ -m ,
while
Nl 751Q1 } } } Q\ m .
We let mj=+j and pj=?j for any j. Now given q1 , ..., qn such
that qjpj for any j, let Q1 , ..., Q\ be a sequence satisfying
the property above for }$j=?$j and }"j=?"j . We let
q=max(?$i , s+t) and r=\+h where h=q+1+m&s,
and let P1 , ..., Pr be the sequence
P+$1?$1 } } } P
+$i+1
q } } } P
+$m
?$m
P+"1?"1 } } } P
+"t
?"t
0 } } } 0
q&(s+t)
Ph Q1 } } } Q\ ,
where Ph=(*u1 } } } uqi .us+l)
. Then it is easy to check (in
fact the proof in this case is entirely similar to the previous
one) that
(M(Pm1q1 x1) } } } (P
mn
qn xn) ) P1 } } } Pr &m P
+"1
?"1
Q1 } } } Q\ ,
while
(N(Pm1q1 x1) } } } (P
mn
qn xn( ) P1 } } } Pr &m Nl751Q1 } } } Q\ .
The remaining cases, where Ml  ’k&1 Nl and x=zi or
yl  ’k&1 Yl and x=xi , are left to the reader. K
The reader may have noticed that, in the base case
(k=1), we could have let mi= instead of mi=1. As a
matter of fact, M and N are already separated in the lazy
*-calculus whenever M ’1 N, since we could replace the
bags P0qi by 0
. However, we could not prove the induction
step (k>1) if we had used *-calculus contexts for separating
M and N such that M ’1 N. For instance, we have
*y .xy ’1 x, which falls into case (1.(c).i), giving the separat-
ing context [](I0x) , hence, using the induction step, we
find [](I1x) to separate 2$ from 2.
On the other hand, one may note that if M and N are
affine, then in the case (k>1) of the proof, the head variable
x cannot occur in M1 , ..., Ms , N1 , ..., Ns , Y1 , ..., Yt (and, by
the ChurchRosser property, one may assume that these
subterms are affine too, since the set of affine *-terms is
closed by ;-reduction). This remark may be exploited to
modify the proof in order to establish the separation lemma
for affine *-terms, that is, Lemma 5.8. The details are left to
the reader (see [7] for a proof).
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